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How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?
Rebecca Tushnet 1
Abstract: Derek Bambauer’s provocative paper argues that, because the remedies
available to people who suffer unconsented distribution of intimate images of themselves
are insufficient, we should amend copyright law to fill the gap. Bambauer’s proposal
requires significant changes to every part of copyright—what copyright seeks to
encourage, who counts as an author/owner, what counts as an exclusive right, what
qualifies as infringement, what suffices as a defense, and what remedies are available.
These differences are not mere details. Among other things, incentivizing intimacy is not
the same thing as incentivizing creativity. Bambauer’s argument that copyright is
normatively empty and already full of inconsistencies and exceptions does not justify
such profound changes. Bambauer’s true target is § 230 of the Communications Decency
Act, which protects online intermediaries from liability stemming from users’ violations
of others’ privacy. Copyright claims aren’t subject to § 230, so his proposal hopes to
force intermediaries to do more in revenge porn cases. But the case for requiring more
from intermediaries to protect privacy should be made on its own merits, not by
distorting copyright law.
Derek Bambauer’s provocative paper starts with a normative proposition: the remedies available
to people who suffer unconsented distribution of intimate images of themselves, often known as
revenge porn, are insufficient. Bambauer is especially critical of the secondary liability regime
for privacy torts. At (First Amendment-inflected) common law, it is hard to hold distributors
liable for such harm, and Congress has made it impossible online by enacting § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, which provides total immunity to a service provider uninvolved
in developing tortious content. 2 Copyright’s remedies, Bambauer observes, are much broader.
And the lack of ability to control distribution is a disincentive for at least some people to create
intimate pictures, even though the creation of intimate pictures might otherwise have social
utility. Because copyright is justified as a means of incentivizing creation, but mostly because its
remedies are good ones, we should therefore call the harm done by unconsented distribution of
intimate images “copyright harm.”
Bambauer is not the first to notice that copyright’s remedies are far broader than those associated
with other rights to control information. Some victims of unconsented distribution of intimate
images have already turned to copyright claims—mostly celebrities to date, but we can imagine
more ordinary folks doing so as well. 3 Likewise, trademark owners have made copyright claims
when trademark’s remedies have proved insufficient for their desires. 4 So have victims of
1
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Bambauer draft at 5.
3
Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
209 (2013).
4
See, e.g., Sarah B. Deutsch, Re: Request for Public Comment on Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of
Claimed Infringement, United States Copyright Office 2 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/2011/initial/verizon.pdf (noting DMCA notices sent on
trademark grounds); Jennifer M. Urban and Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J.
621, 668-70, 678 (2006) (discussing noncopyright claims framed as copyright claims for purposes of benefiting
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negative reviews, circumventing defamation’s strict limits on liability. 5 Of course, those
limits—like trademark’s limits—are there for a reason, and so too with the privacy torts
generally thought most apposite to the harm done by unconsented distribution of intimate
images.
So how should we think about Bambauer’s proposal? As Part I of this response details, the
proposal requires significant changes to every part of copyright—what copyright seeks to
encourage, who counts as an author/owner, what counts as an exclusive right, what qualifies as
infringement, what suffices as a defense, and what remedies are available.
Part II argues that these differences are not merely definitional. They go to the effects of the law
as well as its goals. Incentivizing intimacy is not the same thing as incentivizing creativity. The
motivations that induce people to create and share intimate images are unlikely to be affected by
a change in copyright law that both creators and abusive disseminators are extremely unlikely to
understand. Copyright works, when it works, as incentive for economically motivated creators;
it handles the non-economically motivated poorly, and it has no real mechanism for
communicating its rules to the laypeople engaged in the bulk of the behavior Bambauer wishes
to change. Misunderstood penalties will neither incent nor deter as hoped.
Bambauer nonetheless argues that the harm he targets is close enough to copyright harm that the
right he wants to grant can fairly be called a copyright right, because copyright—particularly
copyright’s concept of authorship—is normatively empty and can be filled any way we want to
fill it. He points to the inconsistencies and special pleading that abound in the current statute,
and argues that adding a sexting epicycle to the current scheme wouldn’t make a difference
worth protesting. I disagree, because of the profound misfit between every aspect of copyright
and the interests at issue here.
Bambauer’s true target is the secondary liability rules for privacy violations, particularly § 230 of
the Communications Decency Act. He argues that intermediaries should be subject to legal
constraints for enabling the unconsented dissemination of intimate media, and that the
intermediary liability he envisions would be constitutional if based out of Title 17. I believe that
avoiding privacy law’s secondary liability regime by calling the proposed cause of action
from DMCA takedown procedures); Fax from Creative Crystal Co. to Google, Inc. (Aug. 22, 2003),
http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=842 (last visited Oct. 15, 2005) (requesting takedown
of sites which use Creative Crystal’s registered trademarks “in metatags and keywords up to 39 times on one page”).
Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Can., Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (Can.) (rejecting trademark owner’s attempt to use
copyright to evade limits on trademark rights); Rebecca Tushnet, INTA: Pharma Panel and Keyword Panel,
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (May 8, 2012), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/05/inta-pharma-panel-andkeyword-panel.html (discussing trademark counsel’s advice to claim copyright in logos and other marks in order to
expand rights).
5
See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (magnate tried to suppress
biography by buying copyrights of quoted articles); Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Ordered to Stop Publishing UserSubmitted Report—Giordano v. Romeo, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/01/ripoff_report_o.htm (business sued critic for defamation and acquired
copyright in critical post, then sent copyright takedown); Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to
Pick a Dentist--Lee v. Makhneich (Forbes Cross-Post), TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (April 23, 2013),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/you_shouldnt_ne.htm (explaining how some professionals have
attempted to use copyright to remove negative online reviews).

“copyright” is a mistake. If the secondary liability rules are wrong and there should be a notice
and takedown scheme for revenge porn—something I’m open to agreeing with—then they
should be changed, not evaded. If the secondary liability rules are right, they should not be
evaded. And the collateral damage from evasion should not be excused by claiming that
copyright is already bollixed.
Ultimately, I can’t agree that we ought to be realists when it comes to escaping § 230 and
formalists when it comes to evaluating the constitutionality of something labeled “copyright.”
Bambauer argues both that the label “copyright” matters, because copyright is about something
in particular and because violations of its exclusive rights deserve particular remedies, and also
that the label is just a move in a language game. Inconsistency is no great vice, but it’s no virtue
either. The case for a new intellectual property (or more properly, privacy or dignity) right for
people depicted in intimate photos and videos could most persuasively be made on its own
merits.
I.

Why Call It Copyright?

Copyright, though it has many complex and reticulated niches, has a general structure. Pamela
Samuelson has recently undertaken a valuable taxonomic project on copyrightable subject
matter, articulating criteria based on the history of and policies underlying copyright law for
what should and shouldn’t be brought into the copyright regime (e.g., gardens, yoga, DNA
sequences). 6 While some of her criteria aren’t very relevant to Bambauer’s proposal, because he
deals with photos and video that are already copyrightable subject matter and instead proposes to
change authorship and rights definitions, 7 several others provide useful guidance. She suggests
that, when considering an expansion of copyright law, we should consider the fit between
copyright’s economic justification and the economic/incentive structure of the subject matter
sought to be protected, specifically whether legal protection will spur investment into the
production of multiple copies for the purpose of sale. 8 We should also consider the fit between
the subject matter and the legal structure of copyright:
This includes the appropriateness of the exclusive rights, the duration of rights,
infringement standards, and copyright remedies, as well as copyright doctrines, such as
the idea/expression distinction, the scenes a faire and merger, fair use and first sale,
classroom and other performance limitations, and the procedures by which copyright
infringement is judged. Often proponents of an expansion in copyright subject matter
focus on a subset of the features of copyright’s legal regime, while ignoring respects in
which a mismatch exists. While special rules can sometimes be developed to adjust the fit
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Pamela Samuelson, Are Gardens, Synthetic DNA, Yoga Sequences, and Fashions Copyrightable? (unpublished
draft, on file with author)
7
For example, the question of how long the subject matter at issue has existed and whether changed circumstances
justify an expansion of copyright is less relevant to Bambauer’s proposal than to DNA sequences, as is whether the
works communicate expressive content. Id. at 22.
8
Id. at 21. Relatedly, she suggests evaluating the similarity of creators and creative outputs in the proposed subject
matter to the creators and creative outputs of conventional copyrightable works: “[T]he greater the mismatch in
these respects, the more likely it is that an extension of copyright to new subject matters will cause distortions or
result in misapplications that will undermine the integrity of the copyright regime.” Id. at 22.

in copyright law, the legal regime fit should be an important criterion in judging whether
subject matter expansion is a sound idea. 9
In line with Samuelson’s framework, the following subsections explore what Bambauer proposes
to change—which turns out to be pretty much every aspect of copyright. The overall effect is
that the right he wants to create can’t be called “copyright” under any current meaning of the
term.
A. What is the incentive-based justification for the right?
The subject matter of copyright has traditionally been limited by the concept of encouraging
creation of expression, not just creation more generally. The threat of underproduction of an
intangible value is addressed many different ways in law. Patent, design patent, trade secret,
trademark dilution, and the right of publicity all, at least according to their proponents, seek to
encourage production by giving owners a right to exclude. 10
As noted by Bambauer and others, the right of privacy can also be seen to protect incentives
generated by exclusive control. The question is—control over what? The answer usually allows
us to identify the category of legal right at issue. When we want the creator to have control over
innovation, the relevant law is patent or trade secret. When we want the creator to have control
over marketing value, the relevant law is trademark dilution or the right of publicity. Bambauer
proposes to shift the locus of control over intimate expression from the right of privacy to
copyright, but identifying “incentives” for “production” in general doesn’t justify putting
anything into the copyright category in particular.
Privacy, and the related ability to control the presentation of one’s self, support the development
of that self. 11 Privacy provides a space for experimentation, self-discovery, and intimacy, all of
which are goods worth having. Intimate media, Bambauer argues, can further these missions of
self-discovery and intimate communication, and therefore incentivizing the creation of intimate
media fits within copyright’s incentive paradigm. 12 Tangible indicia of intimacy and selfdiscovery, however, are valuable to self-development not because they are tangible, and not
because they contain creative expression—those are just incidental phenomena related to the fact
that modern Americans live digital, mediated lives—but rather because they support this private,
desiring, intimate self. As a result, the incentives Bambauer wishes to provide are not directed at
generating expression fixed in a tangible medium, the traditional—and constitutionally
9

Id. at 21-22.
See, e.g., Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (design patent); Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (patent); Restatement (Third)
Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995) (trade secret); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity & Privacy §
2.2 (1987) (right of publicity); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 308-09 (1987) (trademark dilution).
11
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1906 (2013) (“Privacy is shorthand for
breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary management that enable and constitute self-development.”);
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 532 (2006) (“The risk of disclosure can prevent
people from engaging in activities that further their own self-development.”).
12
I therefore find it curious that Bambauer argues that privacy theory doesn’t recognize the benefits of intimate
media. Bambauer at 55. His description seems to me to fit very well into a discourse about the benefits of privacy,
which include intimate interactions.
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required—subject matter of copyright. 13 Privacy’s intimacy-promoting goals would be equally
well-served by (1) protecting nonexpressive/factual intimate communications, including
communications too basic or standard to be deemed protectable by copyright under conventional
copyright doctrine, and by (2) protecting unfixed communications such as realtime telephone
conversations, video chats, or even face-to-face gossip.
The examples Bambauer uses also show that the targeted harm is not about expression, but rather
about the social meaning of exposure (especially for women):
A female Yale Law School student targeted by defamatory attacks, including about her
intimate life, on the AutoAdmit Web site did not obtain a single summer job offer during
on-campus recruiting with law firms…. A student teacher was denied a degree in
education after inadvertently revealing a MySpace photo that showed her drinking an
alcoholic beverage while wearing a pirate costume. A Georgia high school teacher was
forced to resign after a parent gained access to her Facebook profile and found a photo of
her holding a pint of beer and glass of wine during a trip to Europe. In Florida, a high
school English teacher was also pressed into quitting her job after her principal found
photos of her modeling swimsuits, under a different name, online. Finally, Citibank
terminated a female employee simply because she was judged to be both attractive and
given to wearing clothes that accentuated her appeal. 14
Notice that all these examples involve gender role enforcement (including concerns about
women’s public consumption of alcohol), but not intimate media. That Bambauer rightly
identifies them as part of the same problem as nonconsensual distribution of intimate media
indicates that the harm is something different than what his proposed solution targets. 15
“Revenge porn employs the darker part of the human emotional spectrum: shame, humiliation,
fear, and disgust,” 16 and it is that source of harm that privacy/dignity-based torts target. By
contrast, copyright usually refuses to recognize harm to the copyright owner’s dignity as a source
of actionable harm: Anne Rice may feel personally assaulted by bad reviews or parodies, 17 but
that’s just too bad for her unless the attack rises to the level of defamation or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Bambauer’s proposal would give copyright new missions: incentivize the creation of intimacy
and prevent harms from exposure, mainly harms suffered by women. These might well be valid
goals, but not ones that fit copyright’s contours.

13

See U.S. Const., art 1, §8, cl. 8 (allowing Congress to protect “[w]ritings” of “[a]uthors,” both terms with arguable
limiting force); 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ….”); Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.… [O]riginality requires independent
creation plus a modicum of creativity ….”).
14
Bambauer, at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
15
Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1982) (sexualized
advertising does the same kind of harm as pornography).
16
Bambauer at 17 (footnote omitted).
17
Sarah Lyall, The People Have Spoken, and Rice Takes Offense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/11/books/11rice.html?_r=0.

B. Who counts as the author/owner of the right?
Bambauer’s proposed right is not a conventional authorship right. Instead of the author of the
fixed work—the person or persons who contributed sufficient copyrightable creativity and
exercised sufficient control over the final work—being the copyright owner, the subject would
own a “copyright” interest under Bambauer’s model. Each subject would enjoy a right to
prevent distribution of intimate media, even as against the person who would otherwise be
deemed the copyright owner. 18 This new right would apparently cover all “intimate media,” but
the proposed definition doesn’t include any requirement that the media have been created with an
intent to limit distribution. Thus, it would appear to work a profound change in the default
ownership rules for pornography as well as for any other photos and video containing sexually
explicit elements, something one might imagine both the adult entertainment and the mainstream
film/TV industry might wish to weigh in on before enactment. 19
Also unlike a regular copyright right, the intimate media right would be waivable (in writing),
but not alienable. 20 Copyrights can presently be licensed nonexclusively based on oral
agreements or by implication from the parties’ conduct. 21 Bambauer’s rule for intimate media
would require a written agreement even for a nonexclusive license. 22 Likewise, because one
problem that arises in intimate media is that one member of a couple shares a sex tape featuring
both of them, waiver by one participant would not waive others’ rights, again in contrast to
existing law, including the existing moral rights provisions in the Copyright Act; 23 presently,
joint authors can grant nonexclusive licenses without the consent of other joint authors. 24
C. What qualifies as infringement?
18

Bambauer at 30 (proposal would “curtail the distribution and display rights enjoyed by the copyright owner of
intimate media”). It is also unclear whether this new interest would affect the copyright term, which for works not
created as works for hire is life of the author plus 70 years. Logically, we could treat the new copyright owner the
way we treat joint authors—the term of a joint work is the life of the longest-surviving author plus 70 years.
19
Bambauer proposes that this right will be waivable in writing, but that’s not sufficient for the modern film
industry, which universally seeks work-for-hire status so that the funding/producing entity is deemed the author of
the work from the outset. Among other things, a mere copyright transfer from the performer is terminable after 35
years. See 17 U.S.C. § 203. Perhaps Bambauer means that waiver should not be considered a “transfer” and
therefore not terminable; if so, his proposal has yet another point of divergence from current copyright law. (No
court would allow the use of the term “waiver” to defeat §203 termination rights in other circumstances; §203 was
designed to be unwaivable. Cf. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that an afterthe-fact agreement that a work was a work for hire is an unenforceable “agreement to the contrary” that can’t
prevent termination given Congress’s intent to protect authors).) Or perhaps Bambauer would allow the creation of
works for hire outside the scope of this new right, which for nonemployees would require (1) a written agreement,
and (2) that the work fall within the enumerated statutory categories of works that can be works for hire. See 17
U.S.C. § 101. In the case of standalone photographs, this might prove a bit tricky, since it’s hard to jam photos into
any of those categories, but for films and photos intended for inclusion in magazines and the like it could probably
be done with relative ease.
20
Bambauer at 30.
21
See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990).
22
Bambauer at 26.
23
Bambauer at 31. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (granting limited moral rights of attribution and integrity to certain works
of visual art); id. §106A(b) (providing that joint authors are co-owners of these moral rights).
24
Bambauer at 13 (“Even if a participant were deemed a joint author of the intimate media [under existing law], she
would be powerless to prevent her co-author from giving permission for the work’s use, regardless of her wishes.”).

Bambauer proposes that the owner of the intimate media right would have the right to prevent
distribution of the work. 25 This right would apparently not be the right to authorize distribution
without the consent of the person who would ordinarily be considered the copyright owner, but a
purely prohibitory right. So, if the subject wasn’t also the cameraperson, she wouldn’t by herself
be able to authorize distribution. By contrast, existing copyright rights are rights to authorize,
not just rights to prohibit; as noted in the previous section, joint authors can grant licenses
without other authors’ consent. It is not clear whether this negative right would have the same
duration as a copyright (currently life plus seventy years).
In addition, the intimate media right would go beyond the current §106 right to control public
performance and display and create a new right to control private performance and display. 26
The right would thus cover instances in which a recipient called his friends over to look at the
image on his phone, which again sounds more like a privacy right than a copyright.
D. What are the defenses to infringement?
Bambauer proposes to eliminate the existing defenses to copyright infringement for intimate
media, including most notably fair use, though presumably the exceptions for educational
institutions, nonprofit performances, etc. would also all have to go.
Because the “intimate media” definition would cover all sexual photos and visuals, even if they
were created for distribution, this could have significant effects on fair use cases, which often
involve sexuality. 27 Consider the recent and already influential case Prince v. Cariou, 28 in which
appropriation artist Richard Prince took photos of Rastafarians and combined them with images
of naked women taken from soft-core magazines:

25

Bambauer at 30. Bambauer also proposes that only actual images should be covered. Bambauer, at 29. I’m not
sure this definition would be likely to survive the drafting process—why not also cover avatars? The interest in
them, especially as they improve in verisimilitude, is likely to be similar, and the right of publicity has similarly
expanded to cover virtual representations. See, e.g., Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013).
26
Bambauer at 30.
27
See Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex. Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L., 273, 278-79 (2007).
28
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).

29

The photographer mostly lost his infringement claim because the use was transformative,
bringing new messages and new meanings to the original photos. But under Bambauer’s new
rule, the models portrayed in the soft-core magazines would have a valid infringement claim
(against Prince and against me) because they didn’t consent to Prince’s use.
Bambauer offers a slightly different scenario:
Consider an artist who uses a photograph of his naked partner in his artwork—perhaps he
is mashing up Soviet-era propaganda images with nude photos. That display of the
intimate photo is highly transformative, pushing the analysis towards finding the use fair.
But, this is irrelevant to his partner, who may not want the photo displayed, regardless of
its artsy surroundings. The possibility of being involuntarily featured may dissuade her
from posing for the photo at all. 30
The use of the hypothetical partner, instead of the image ripped from a magazine (as occurred in
Cariou), leaves the impression that the problem is only relational (making it appropriate for a
privacy tort), so that we needn’t worry about fair use. But fair use’s transformativeness doctrine
specifically favors precisely the kinds of uses that make copyright owners, and sometimes the
subjects of their works, feel bad—critical, mocking, even cruel uses. 31 These fair uses may
decrease the incentive to produce works compared to a world in which criticism wasn’t allowed,
but copyright has deliberately chosen not to provide that kind of incentive to authors and
owners. 32
29

Richard Prince, Djuana Barnes.
Bambauer at 39 (footnotes omitted).
31
See, e.g., Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1998).
32
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing
theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.
30

Bambauer proposes to substitute a newsworthiness defense for fair use. 33 That would still seem
to spell trouble for Richard Prince (though maybe not for me), as the specific images of the
women in the pictures are unlikely to be newsworthy, though I can imagine some courts
contorting themselves to find newsworthiness based on the women’s prior consent to appear in a
soft-core magazine.
But newsworthiness isn’t a copyright defense. 34 If fair use is a poor fit for the interests that the
proposal addresses, they might not be copyright interests. As Bambauer notes, there are existing
causes of action that have newsworthiness defenses and don’t have fair use defenses. They’re
privacy torts, whose precedent Bambauer suggests courts could incorporate in defining the
boundaries of the new defense. 35 But if privacy and newsworthiness go so well together, what’s
wrong with using the existing privacy torts? Bambauer’s answer is that the trouble lies with
existing remedies, to which I now turn.
E. What are the remedies for infringement?
1. Statutory damages
Statutory damages, enforced by private parties, are one key reason to choose copyright instead of
some other law, according to Bambauer. 36 But, though Bambauer says “[d]amages would follow
copyright’s established system,” 37 he proposes to change that system. Bambauer notes that
getting a lawyer to take a revenge porn case is difficult, and so is getting a lawyer to take an
ordinary copyright case. 38 Some revenge porn cases won’t involve works that were timely
registered (registered before the infringement began or within a few months of publication), 39
and timely registration is a prerequisite for an award of statutory damages and attorney’s fees,
even assuming that the individual infringer had enough cash to pay an award. 40 Bambauer

Because ‘parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as
artistically,’ the role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and]
copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.’”) (citations omitted).
33
Bambauer at 38.
34
Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985).
35
Bambauer at 38.
36
Bambauer at 25.
37
Bambauer at 33.
38
Cf. Mickey H. Osterreicher & Alicia Wagner Calzada, Comments of the National Press Photographers
Association, Nat'l Press Photographers Ass'n, at 7 (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://blogs.nppa.org/advocacy/files/2012/01/final_ Copyright-Small-Claims-Comments-01-17-12-1.pdf (describing
photo infringement as rampant online and stating that “most will never be prosecuted because it is economically
unfeasible for the creators to commence an action in federal court”).
39
I’m not so sure about this—the works involved in revenge porn cases may well count as unpublished, as long as
the creator didn’t publish them herself. Distribution to a limited group with no purpose of further distribution is
probably not publication. Thus, registration before filing suit might well qualify the victim for statutory damages,
assuming she’s the copyright owner. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87
Notre Dame L. Rev. 135, 147 (2011). And juries probably would consider the awfulness of the disseminator’s
harassing and demeaning motive in setting a statutory damage award, even though that’s not generally a factor in
copyright statutory damage awards (again, because revenge porn doesn’t implicate ordinary copyright interests).
40
Bambauer at 21.

would solve this problem by removing the timely registration requirement for statutory
damages. 41
But there is no reason that a standalone, sui generis law against revenge porn couldn’t also allow
for private remedies, including statutory damages. No reason, that is, other than § 230, which
would block the imposition of statutory damages on intermediaries, even ones who refused to
honor takedown requests after a plaintiff succeeded in winning a claim against an unauthorized
sharer of intimate media. 42 The sharers themselves, however, could likely be made individually
liable for statutory damages under a specifically drafted law targeting revenge porn as a privacy
tort—this could supplement or replace potential criminal liability. 43 At the very least, it would
be fruitful to explore the justifications for and potential arguments against a sui generis right, as
Pam Samuelson and Jerome Reichman among others have done with respect to other interests
that don’t fit well with current intellectual property regimes. 44
Statutory damages still might not be enough to convince an attorney to sue a victim’s horrible
ex-boyfriend, unless he also happens to have $150,000 in the bank. Only big firms tend to seek
statutory damages against petty infringers like music uploaders Jammie Thomas and Joel
Tenenbaum. 45 There is not much chance these statutory damages awards will ever be paid, and
the recording industry couldn’t have thought they would be; its lawyers got paid to send a
message.
The only predictable, law-abiding deep pockets in this area belong to intermediaries, which is
why Bambauer also suggests changing the law governing them.
2. Intermediary liability
Bambauer proposes altering 17 U.S.C. § 512, which currently provides a notice and takedown
scheme for alleged copyright infringement. He suggests that § 512 should be altered with
respect to intimate media specifically, and that this would be simple to implement because
internet service providers are already familiar with this provision (known as DMCA notice and
takedown). 46 The new system would be similar to the existing DMCA, but with different
information provision and redaction requirements. It’s not clear whether Bambauer supports the
41

Bambauer at 35.
See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008) (allowing
intermediary to refuse original poster’s request to take down content and still keep §230 protection).
43
See Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ should be a crime, CNN OPINION (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/index.html?hpt=hp_t4; Mary Anne Franks,
Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper, Sept. 18, 2013, available at
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/uploads/1/3/2/8/13286642/franks_ncp_working_paper_9.18.pdf (proposing draft
criminalization bill).
44
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Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2310-12 (1994) (arguing for sui generis protection for computer programs).
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existing DMCA rule that a counter-notification entitles the intermediary to restore access to the
accused work unless the claimant files suit. 47
Nor is it clear that Bambauer would allow existing defenses for intermediaries. Compliance with
the DMCA provides relief from any money damages that would otherwise be available to a
plaintiff, but, even for non-DMCA compliant services, the ordinary rules of secondary liability
would still require the plaintiff to establish that the intermediary was contributorily or vicariously
liable for the infringing content before any remedy could be available against the intermediary. 48
A blogger who allows comments may not have a DMCA agent on file with the Copyright Office
and would therefore be ineligible for DMCA protection, but the blogger is still not automatically
liable for infringement when a commenter posts infringing material. Thus, in some
circumstances, an intermediary could choose noncompliance with notice and takedown and still
evade liability under existing law. 49
I’m unsure that the problems of intimate media distribution are amenable to the DMCA solution.
One major source of trouble in the sexting realm has been photos shared through secure
messaging services (SMS). Those systems aren’t set up to make notice and takedown effective,
and standard phone networks that carry SMS don’t meet the underlying standards for secondary
copyright liability (though, again, perhaps Bambauer is also willing to change those). 50
Traditional websites would be covered by this new right, but to the extent that intimate media
circulate in different ways from the average DMCA target does, that’s a further indication that
what we have isn’t a copyright problem.
F. Summary: A right granted by Title 17, not a copyright
Bambauer proposes a right with a different justification from copyright, owned by someone other
than the ordinary copyright owner, infringed by different acts, with different defenses, and with
different remedies. When you’re making this many changes, it might be time to admit that the
proposal does not involve copyright, but rather a sui generis right placed in Title 17 for another
purpose. That purpose, as the next part explores, is to avoid CDA § 230. This makes his
47

He speaks of the subject’s written consent as a defense, and of the intermediary’s immunity after complying with
a takedown notice as a reason not to worry about the intermediary’s difficulty in verifying written consent,
Bambauer at 37, but that just means the intermediary will always take down content whenever a notice is proper in
form, in order to secure that immunity. Should a counter-notification that claims to have written consent be
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See, e.g., Hotfile decision (finding Hotfile ineligible for DMCA safe harbor, but not necessarily liable on
contributory infringement theory).
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Nov 1, 2013 4:30 AM CDT,
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See Luvdarts, LLC v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2013) (owners of multimedia
messaging networks couldn’t be held liable for copyright infringement by users; plaintiff couldn’t successfully
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proposal notably distinct from other not-quite-copyright interventions into the statute such as
microchip design protection or vessel hull design protection.
II.

Why Not Call It Copyright?

Why are all these changes required to make revenge porn fit a copyright model? In this part, I
suggest that renaming the problem of revenge porn is unlikely to help us solve it. The incentive
theory does not justify creating a new intimate media right in Title 17, because copyright
doctrine’s levers for affecting human motivations don’t fit the behaviors at issue, though privacy
law’s might. Copyright law’s present messiness is an insufficient justification for making so
many alterations to copyright’s foundations, and the constitutional issues raised by the new right
will still exist no matter its statutory surrounding. Finally, calling a new right a “copyright” has
risks of its own, given Bambauer’s desire to evade § 230.
A. Not All Incentives Are the Same 51
This mismatch between copyright’s incentive paradigm and the benefits of intimate
communication isn’t just theoretical or definitional. It can’t be fixed by deciding that we want
“copyright” to incentivize more than just expression. Bambauer writes that “the classic
justification for copyright” is that “the threat of uncontrolled copying deters potential creators.” 52
The extent to which copyright incentivizes expression in the first place—as opposed to
distribution—is hotly contested. 53 And Bambauer’s description of copyright cuts off the
specifically economic rationale of the copyright story: the threat of uncontrolled copying deters
potential creators who need or want to get paid for creating works. 54 As the Supreme Court
explained:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
“Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 55
51

Bambauer proposes a right to suppress dissemination. This is not necessarily economic in nature, just as there are
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for intermediaries to invest in monetization of authors’ creations), available at
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55
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This is why copyright provides primarily economic rights, with only extremely limited moral
rights for certain limited-edition visual works, 56 and why sometimes copyright provides only
compulsory licenses—a right to get paid—instead of a right to control. 57 The right to get paid is
deemed sufficient to induce creation of the kinds of works copyright seeks to incentivize. 58
Bambauer later gives a more complete account of the conventional justification, noting that
“[a]uthors face the time and expense of creating works initially, and must price this sunk cost
into their per-copy fee (average cost)…. Copyright law is one way out of this dilemma [in which
consumers would prefer to get a copy from a lower-cost copier who didn’t invest in creation]: it
forces consumers to pay the author, at average cost, to bribe the author to produce the work
initially.” 59 But, as Bambauer immediately acknowledges, 60 the “time and expense” faced by the
ordinary author creating with the hope of remuneration isn’t the same as the intimate risks
Bambauer identifies that might stop a potential creator of intimate media in her tracks. With
intimate media, creators aren’t looking to be “bribed” to surrender their photos. Nor are copyists
generally looking to sell the photos once acquired.
Even creators of works who intend them to be distributed are only patchily affected by
copyright’s incentives, 61 and the failure to fit is even greater with intimate works not intended for
public distribution. Bambauer’s example of the disparate use of intimate media by LGBT
individuals is an excellent illustration of the issue: 62 it is hard to imagine that sexual identity is
correlated with anything copyright might incentivize, or with knowledge of the difference
between the DMCA and § 230 of the CDA. Rather (on the assumption that current law offers no
protection), LGBT individuals may simply be bearing more risks in their relationships, as they
do in many other ways, regardless of the state of intellectual property and privacy law.
But set that all aside for the moment. To get an incentive effect from an extension of legal
protection, people would have to know the law and believe that they can effectively make use of
it if their trust is betrayed. 63 Both of these assumptions are hard to credit. At the start, there’s
the optimism bias Bambauer discusses: 64 just as most people who get married are sure that they
won’t be among the large percentage of couples who divorce, most people who send intimate
media are sure they won’t be victims of a perfidious partner. As one victim recounted, “He said
56

17 U.S.C. §106A.
17 U.S.C. §114.
58
Cf. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT
(2007) (proposing to replace most of copyright with compulsory licenses to better fulfill its incentive function in the
digital age).
59
Bambauer at 18.
60
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Bambauer at 16.
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if I didn’t want to send them to him, that meant that I didn’t trust him, which meant that I didn’t
love him.” 65 As she told the New York Times, even after her experience of having her pictures
posted online—which included being stalked by a stranger—her own friends continued to send
nude pictures of themselves to their boyfriends. “You don’t want to really think that five years
down the line, your boyfriend at the time could be your not-boyfriend and do something really
bad to you.” 66
In addition to the optimism bias, people simply don’t think about the law when they create
intimate media, which means that increased legal protection wouldn’t spur more creation. In
order for Bambauer’s incentives to work, creators of intimate media would have to believe that
the change in the legal regime had been absorbed by recipients with enough certainty that the
recipients would be noticeably more likely to hesitate—while in the mood to get revenge—
before sharing. It is hard to imagine a rational calculation in this form: “yes, I don’t trust him all
the way, and he might show the pictures to all his friends, but I’d be able to sue him and his ISP
for damages if he did, so that gives me the extra confidence I need to send the pictures.” 67
In practice, these calculations aren’t done consciously, but rather with the aid of background
heuristics, expectations, and assumptions. But those assumptions aren’t likely to be correct.
Misunderstandings about law, particularly intellectual property law, are widespread. 68 To the
extent that people already believe that their intimate media are legally protected, of course, they
will not be deterred from creating media now, though they may later be harmed by a relationship
betrayal, and they need no additional incentive for creation. 69 To the extent that they don’t
65
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understand their rights, the issue is largely one of education, and even a change in the law won’t
change that lack of understanding. The knowledge gap affects both the creators (in need of
incentives) and the unauthorized disseminators (in need of disincentives).
Consider in this context the teenagers who’ve been arrested for disseminating child pornography
because they shared intimate media, sometimes consensually. 70 Whether the problem lies in
their understanding of the law, or their practical capacity to conform their conduct to the law, an
additional civil remedy seems unlikely to deter what criminal law and the prospect of lifetime
sex offender registration hasn’t. 71 Nor are most producers of explicit intimate media likely to be
complying with 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a), which provides that any person who produces visual
depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” must “create and maintain individually
identifiable records pertaining to every performer portrayed.” 72 Many producers and
disseminators of intimate media could have bigger problems than copyright, if the law ever came
knocking. 73 If we’re really worried about people declining to create intimate media because they
accurately understand the state of the law, we might want to look at the criminal code first. In
truth, as Bambauer says, “the deterrence story is simply that: a story. It does no real work in
changing behavior.” 74 (He says that about the creators of intimate media, but it is at least as true
of the distributors.)

people now? After all, Snapchat is most risk-limiting with respect to short-term or new relationships. The person
who creates intimate media with or for someone she’s been seeing for five years is less likely to use Snapchat
precisely because she trusts her partner.
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Relatedly, most people never consult lawyers, and most legal wrongs go unredressed in court. 75
Victims may have difficulty finding a lawyer with expertise in the subject. They may be
ashamed of being betrayed, and fear greater exposure if they sue—this is known as the
“Streisand effect” from an early case in which photos of Barbra Streisand’s house spread more
widely as she attempted to suppress them. Many of the victims whose cases Bambauer discusses
would already have been able to send DMCA takedown notices. In any case in which they were
both the subject and the photographer/videographer (that is, any case involving a “selfie”), they
would already be authors under current law. Both Bambauer and I agree that the fact that those
victims are also considered “authors” is unrelated to the harm they suffer from unconsented
distribution. Nonetheless, it’s notable that lawyers don’t seem to be bringing droves of copyright
infringement lawsuits on behalf of selfie victims.
Even for existing author-victims, of course, Bambauer’s proposed reforms could increase the
chance of receiving damages from a potentially deep-pocketed intermediary, so perhaps lawyers
would more aggressively seek out clients (though if there’s widespread compliance with the
amended DMCA, then we’re back to the scenario in which there’s not much money in any given
case). My aim in this section is simply to show that the identification of behaviors we wish to
incentivize does not mean that copyright is an appropriate tool, even if copyright is also about
incentives.
B. Tu Quoque: Is this any worse than what we already have?
Bambauer’s basic response to the distinctions between what we now call copyright and what he
wants to add to Title 17 is to point to the inconsistencies in current copyright law:
[C]opyright is nothing if not a congeries of industry-specific tweaks. Copyrights in sound
recordings do not include a right of public performance—except via digital audio
transmission. Architectural works under copyright have no protection against
photographs or pictures that reproduce a building instantiating the work, so long as that
building is publicly visible. The first sale doctrine lets lawful purchasers rent movie
DVDs, but not software DVDs. A small cafe may show television programming on a set
behind the bar [without paying a license fee], but a giant restaurant in Times Square may
not—unless it complies with restrictions on the size and number of televisions and
speakers. Copyright is unprincipled: it is all about special pleading. Distortion of an
elegant copyright system is not a risk, because it is already distorted. 76
Indeed, U.S. copyright law has a number of medium- and industry-specific provisions that
mostly can be explained by lobbying and special pleading. Copyright isn’t pure, so, the
argument goes, introducing another impurity is not a problem.
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At some point, however, impurity converts to a new substance, which is what Bambauer’s
proposal does. None of the provisions Bambauer discusses were introduced merely to
circumvent limits on some other right, 77 which is why none of them required wholesale changes
in every aspect of copyright—the addition of a digital public performance right for sound
recordings, for example, didn’t require a change in authorship rules, liability standards, or fair
use defenses. Nor did the extension of protection to architectural works (required by our
accession to the Berne Convention). 78
Relatedly, all of these are industry-specific tweaks, directed at the economic needs and market
configurations that were current at the moment the legislature acted. They aren’t content-based.
By contrast, the intimate media right isn’t about the business deals and compromises made by
any industry. It’s about protecting a privacy interest. If an intimate media right is a copyright, I
have difficulty seeing the barriers to giving a victim of defamation a copyright, or even doing the
same for any subject of a work, defamatory or not. 79 Authorship may be a highly flexible
concept, but that doesn’t make it entirely meaningless.
I’m a fan of categorical thinking. It can make sense to group “games” together even if we can
say that chess doesn’t share any significant characteristics with bouncing a ball, as long as each
game has family resemblances to other games in the group. 80 Still, there is a difference between
a concept with a wide range of reasonable meanings and a concept that has been completely
emptied out. 81 To my mind, calling an intimate media right “copyright” would tilt too far to the
latter.
C. Constitutionality of the New System
Bambauer is aware that he’s suggesting some radical revisions. Among the consequences is the
potential vulnerability of his new right to a First Amendment challenge, even though copyright
laws are generally unproblematic under current doctrine. Bambauer suggests that his proposal
would be constitutionally suspect if called a privacy right, but that the relaxed scrutiny given to
77
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copyright laws would protect this new right if it were called copyright. However, no judge is
that bald-faced about formalism, as Bambauer recognizes. 82 The Supreme Court has specifically
identified fair use as a key constitutional limit on copyright, 83 and his proposal removes fair use
as a defense.
Because the “traditional contours” of copyright would be altered in every particular by the new
intimate media right, some other kind of First Amendment scrutiny would have to apply.
Bambauer suggests that his proposed newsworthiness defense would suffice to allow the new
right to survive First Amendment scrutiny, based on precedent from privacy cases. 84 Here, the
snake swallows its own tail, formalism (copyright is a First Amendment-free zone) converting to
functionalism (newsworthiness is an appropriate defense) just at the point at which Bambauer
acknowledges that labels can’t be dispositive.
Bambauer offers the following dichotomy: “copyright is left with an uncomfortable dilemma:
either the line of cases finding newsworthiness to be adequate free speech protection in other
contexts is misguided, or fair use must be analyzed formalistically.” 85 There’s another
alternative, which is that copyright is doing different things than other laws, requiring different
First Amendment limits. One could equally assert that fair use in every copyright case, including
Prince v. Cariou as it was actually litigated, could constitutionally be replaced by
newsworthiness, or by the constitutionally required limits on defamation. One could also argue
that the requirements of falsity and malice for defamation could be replaced with fair use’s
consideration of transformativeness and market harm. Those switches don’t make sense,
however, because the justifications for the rights, and correspondingly the interests involved on
both sides, differ.
Current precedents from the privacy torts could make newsworthiness a sufficient First
Amendment limit on the new intimate media right, certainly as applied to individual uploaders. 86
But a key question, unanswered by Bambauer’s analysis, is how newsworthiness would interact
with new forms of dissemination. Newsworthiness case law developed in the context of
traditional publishers’ deliberate selections of what to publish. Imposing liability on ISPs for
non-newsworthy images disseminated by their users is not obviously constitutional, certainly not
when it comes to vicarious liability, which doesn’t require knowledge. 87 In general, the Supreme
82
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Court has been wary of liability for speech distributors in the absence of fault. 88 Even if this new
right might be constitutional as applied to perfidious individuals, then, the key part of the
remedy—its extension to intermediaries, which defeats § 230’s immunity—might not be.
D. Me Too: Other candidates for “copyright” extension
Bambauer notes that we’ve increased copyright enforcement and remedies in order to go after
massive online copying, without particular evidence that this helped copyright owners. 89 Thus,
he concludes, we need not be sure that his proposed reform would work before we enact it. I
don’t find that analogy persuasive. It seems to me to be an argument about industry capture, not
about good policy. However, the comparison does strengthen my fear that any rights given to
subjects of intimate media will be demanded on fairness and economic incentive grounds by
other groups much better positioned to make incentive-based claims as rational economic actors
seeking only profit maximization. Given the expansions in the scope of copyright rights and
remedies required to make Bambauer’s new right effective, the likely demands for parity
between existing copyright rights and new intimate media rights strike me as undesirable side
effects of putting his proposed new right in Title 17.
I find particularly puzzling Bambauer’s contention that using copyright would solve the problem
of § 230:
[U]sing IP law effectively addresses issues with intimate media within the existing
statutory framework for Internet intermediaries. Other approaches, such as privacy-based
ones, would need to alter the contours of the immunity for interactive computer services
from third-party liability created by Section 230 . . . . Some of these proposals would not
merely alter Section 230, they would eviscerate it. This is undesirable. Section 230 has
been critical to the development of a thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on content
supplied by users. 90
But Bambauer’s proposal isn’t operating in secret. It’s perfectly obvious that his new right is
designed to evade § 230. He even touts that as a virtue. Yet other claimants are equally capable
of deploying formalist concepts to serve realist ends. Any attempt to enact this proposal would
give everyone whose ox is gored by § 230 an opportunity to show up and argue that their
interests should be considered “copyright” interests too, at least for purposes of avoiding § 230,
since we’re already doing a lot of tailoring of “copyright” to deal with intimate media. I can see
no functional or political difference between amending Title 17 to evade § 230 and amending §
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230 itself. Either intermediaries depend on § 230 and we should leave it alone, or we should be
willing to tweak it to impose a new duty on them because revenge porn is so bad.
Beyond § 230, many other claimants would have an interest in getting the benefits of this new
right’s divergence from existing copyright rights. For example, proponents of publicity rights
could ask why other, nonsexual portrayals wouldn’t justify similar veto rights (subject to a
newsworthiness defense). 91 Additionally, Jessica Silbey’s empirical work reveals a strong desire
for more rights to control reputation among creators; many of them would welcome a new moral
right of withdrawal. 92 Copyright owners of all stripes would also love to have a new right to
control, and therefore monetize, private performance and display. If this is a copyright, after all,
then other copyright owners have similarly (and more plausibly incentive-based) claims for
control.
Likewise, many copyright owners would be thrilled to get rid of the timely registration
requirement for statutory damages. Most small copyright owners—precisely the group unlikely
to timely register—have the same difficulties as victims of revenge porn in finding legal
representation, and thus an equally compelling argument for extension of this new remedy to
them. 93 And copyright owners hate the burdens placed on them by the DMCA’s notice and
takedown requirements, which they perceive as forcing them into an endless game of whack-amole. 94 If we’re creating a new notice and takedown scheme with different contours, surely their
desires should be taken into account as well.
III.

Conclusion

Bambauer’s paper challenges us to navigate the is and the ought: whatever copyright ought to be,
he argues, is less important for people interested in protecting victims of nonconsensual exposure
than what it is, which cannot be known at a conceptual level but can only be observed from the
actual messy contours of copyright and therefore can be changed in order to serve any reasonable
purpose. But categories, however imperfect, exist for reasons—reasons that even realists
generally acknowledge. Contradictions and inconsistencies are inevitable, but that doesn’t mean
they’re all of equal worth. Bambauer’s claim that copyright can be whatever we want as long as
we mention incentives seems to me not to be useful, in Felix Cohen’s formulation: “a definition
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is useful if it insures against risks of confusion more serious than any that the definition itself
contains.” 95 A more productive debate would consider a right against revenge porn, and the
relationship between individual and intermediary liability for revenge porn, on its own merits.
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